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Abstract  
This article notes that while there is a large literature lamenting increasing assaults on 
academic freedom, there is little address to ways in which it might be preserved. 
Sampling that writing, it finds some concern with protecting academic freedom in 
extreme scenarios, via discrete programmes, and generalised dissidence, but no 
discussion of determinate action applicable to all Arts and Humanities research. Defining 
academic freedom via the UK’s legal framework and elaboration in Judith Butler’s 
writing, the article inventorises significant assaults in recent times, noting the roles of 
government and the market in such. Following the literature review, it proposes a new, 
interventionist tactic for preserving academic freedom, suggesting that undue constraints 
should be annotated when research is written up, and that this space should also be used 
to suggest constructive alternatives. This strategy is demonstrated as the article 
acknowledges some of the constraints on its own production and suggests redress.  
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Academic freedom: In an ideal world 
In 1998, as a young lecturer teaching on a Fine Art degree, I purchased a small 
book: An Ideal Syllabus: Artists, Critics and Curators Choose the Books We Need 
to Read, edited by the American art-critic, Jerry Salz (1998). 
Then, as now, the idea of insisting upon a syllabus was not in tension with the 
notion of academic freedom, providing prescription occurred from inside a 
disciplinary field in the interests of that field; by those involved in its delivery, as 
artists, critics and curators are for art-education. Time and again, in Salz’s book, 
‘an ideal syllabus’ is predicated on nothing more interested than the trajectory of a 
given intellectual project. So these booklists are ‘ideal’ in both the ordinary sense 
of the term (the ‘best’), and in its philosophical inflection, as they are determined 
by the realm of ideas rather than material reality. 
Twenty years on, and things have changed considerably following the rise of neo-
liberalism in the 1980s which started to reverse ‘eight centuries’ of universities’ 
‘relative autonomy’ and which saw ‘[t]he corporatization of the university [...] 
around the world’ (Hearn, 2003). Or as Stefan Collini writes: ‘[m]uch of our con- 
temporary discourse about universities still draws on, or unwittingly presumes       
[...] the idea that the university is a partly protected space in which the search for 
deeper and wider understanding takes precedence over all more immediate goals’ 
while adding that ‘we may be nearing the point, at least in Britain, where [that 
version of the university] is starting to give way’ because ‘[i]f “prosperity” is the 
overriding value in market democracies, then universities must be repurposed as 
“engines of growth”’ (Collini, 2016). 
Now, questions of curricula are far more often subject to non-subject-based 
concerns, and in particular, determinations originating in political economy, rang- 
ing from the introduction of tuition fees which, in the UK, occurred in 1998, to 
government initiatives proscribing and prescribing certain kinds of speech. So 
when writing a new syllabus, or revising a curriculum, I frequently find myself 
being asked to refer to institutionally prescribed agendas; for instance, university 
strategies. Amongst other things, these agendas frame curriculum development 
with a set of abstract concepts – such as ‘practical wisdom’ – to be realised either 
as curriculum content and/or as teaching and learning strategies. And while these 
concepts are broad enough to be embodied in diverse ways, and may be addressed 
at any point in the process of curriculum design, e.g. as an over-arching scheme 
that sets other things in motion, or as a thread to be entwined with others, they 
nevertheless occupy curriculum-space. Certainly, it can sometimes seem that there 
is little room for academics’ chosen content once external agendas have been 
heeded. 
To note this is not to say these schemes are not well-intentioned. Demonstrably, 
they are, and often specify ideas and values that are central to Arts and Humanities 
agendas. But the point remains: that this is an extra- disciplinary direction of 
curricula that is symptomatic of a host of initiatives that (also) impact research. As 
Robert M O’Neil writes: ‘[i]n an ideal world [...] legislatures, boards, and 
administrators would always recognize the need for independent thought and 
inquiry on a campus. But that is not the world in which we live’ (O’Neil, 2008: 1). 
Academic discourse: Freedom, and legitimate constraints 
In discussing academic freedom, I refer the concept to two frameworks. First, as a 
UK academic, I will look to the legal setting in which my academic freedom 
operates, and then to Judith Butler’s philosophical interrogation of the term in 
‘Critique, Dissent, Disciplinarity’ (2009). 
The legal framework in the UK 
As the University and College Union (‘UCU’) notes, ‘academic freedom’ is 
enshrined in law: ‘the 1988 Education Reform Act [in the UK] established the 
legal right of academics’ to ‘question and test’ (UCU is now quoting the Act itself) 
‘received wisdom and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular 
opinions without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or the 
privileges they may have’ (UCU, 2009). This frames ‘academic freedom’ as a 
‘negative liberty’, entailing the ‘absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints’ 
(Carter, 2016) or freedom from punishment for what might be described as 
‘academic self-expression’. 
And yet, this ‘freedom’ is relative. Even in legal terms, it is a ‘qualified right’ – 
subject to other laws – which may, in certain instances, over-ride academics’ self-
expression. As UK legislation states: 
The exercise of these freedoms [of expression, including Academic Freedom], since it 
carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection 
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received 
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. (United 
Kingdom Government, 1998: 10.2) 
As this text proposes, even in a basic juridical framework, ‘academic freedom’ 
opens onto convolution, if largely for reason of its imbrication with responsibility. 
Judith Butler’s essay usefully expands and explores the concept’s complexity. 
Judith Butler: Academic freedom and the state 
Approaching the subject of academic freedom via Jacques Derrida among others, 
Butler addresses the way in which it involves an elaborate and potentially 
paradoxical exchange of power between University and state, which goes beyond 
a simple if qualified freedom. 
As Butler writes: 
[t]o make a strong case for academic freedom, we have to understand the kind of freedom 
we are defending and to be able to describe its permutations. If a certain kind of critical 
operation of thought is part of the very exercise of this freedom, then we have to specify 
the sense of critical that we consider worth defending. (Butler, 2009: 775) 
For Butler, this ‘sense of the critical’ begins with ‘its formulation in Kant’ for 
whom it is ‘bound up with the question of legitimate and illegitimate state 
interventions in academic life’ (Butler, 2009: 776). For Kant, Butler notes, critique 
is identified with the discipline of philosophy. Philosophy, whose critical task is to 
‘test public views and proclamations against the laws of reason, and to maintain 
autonomy in relation to public directives of all kinds’, is ‘thus defined as 
unconstrained [by the state] precisely through its critical function’ (Butler, 2009: 
779). This sets philosophy apart from other disciplines ‘whose task is to expound 
and maintain the public good’ and which are therefore understood as ‘legitimately’ 
governed by politics (Butler, 2009: 779). 
However, proceeding via Derrida, Butler then proposes, deconstructively, that in 
several ways, (Kant’s) philosophy is not free of the state. First, ‘state power 
operates to support philosophy’ when ‘the form that support takes is to withdraw 
supervision over the paths that philosophy takes’ (Butler, 2009: 780) and second, 
‘philosophy comes to be defined by what it is not’, when ‘its lack of constraint 
depends upon the constraint imposed upon other disciplines or faculties’ (Butler, 
2009: 779). While most working understandings of academic freedom look 
towards the first point (it is realized in the ‘Haldane principle’1), the second is 
more abstruse, in referring an outmoded understanding of ‘the disciplines’ to a 
form of structuralist analysis. 
Certainly, in this political-institutional account of academic freedom, the idea of 
an ‘uncontaminated’ realm for such appears less simple. And there is more. As 
Butler goes onto note: 
conversely, philosophy [underwritten in its ‘freedom’ by the state] names the moment in 
which reason, defined as the power to judge autonomously, establishes the possibility for 
political dissent, that is, for refusing to accept certain commands or sanctions from the 
state as legitimate. (Butler, 2009: 780) 
Thus philosophy, permitted by the state to critique is, by virtue of that licence, 
permitted to critique the state with a ‘sort of questioning, which is not necessarily 
grounded in existing convention or established norm, but which takes existing 
conventions and norms as its objects’ (Butler, 2009: 786). And invoking Michel 
Foucault, whose essay ‘What is Critique?’ (1997) informs her article more than 
deconstruction, Butler proposes that academic freedom enables the expression of 
‘how not to be governed’ (Butler, 2009: 791). 
This understanding of academic freedom opens on to all sorts of issues and 
scenarios. One, which is pertinent to this discussion, concerns the reflexive return 
of academic freedom so construed. For in threatening the existence of the state, 
when that underwrites academic freedom, academic freedom comprises the 
potential to remove the conditions of its own existence. As Butler writes: 
But the very granting of the right of dissent, although an act of power, is also an act in 
which power checks itself. In other words, the state derives its own legitimacy through 
granting rights of dissent, but to the extent that it cannot control the terms of dissent, it 
also allows for a deterioration of its own claims, a suspension of its own mandate, and 
even a withdrawal or compromise of its own sovereignty. (Butler, 2009: 793) 
When critique (as an aspect of academic freedom) has such tremendous power, 
two things must be noted. First, that for Butler, critique does not appear to need 
the university because it occurs ‘every time and any time the question of what 
constitutes a legitimate government command or policy is raised’ (Butler, 2009: 
780). And second: that pursuing her critique of Kant via Derrida, Butler queries 
the exclusive identification within the University of philosophy with critique. 
Seeming to refer this to the problem of Kant’s ‘translation’, i.e. application to ‘the 
present’, Butler proposes that ‘the operation of critique takes place [not only] 
within the discipline of philosophy’ but also ‘every place and any place its 
distinguishing questions get posed’ (Butler, 2009: 780). From this it follows that 
critique belongs ‘as Derrida has insisted, throughout the university’ (Butler, 2009: 
780). This understanding of critique defines the current scope of academic 
freedom: as encompassing all disciplines. And as others have noted, it may also 
include the inter-disciplinary, except in its instrumental form ‘as a problem- based 
practice governed by determinants outside the walls of the university’ (Hearn, 
2003). 
In summary, for Butler then, ‘academic freedom’ as an attribute of academic 
speech that exists throughout the university, is disturbed in its simple being, in a 
range of ways; for example, as it threatens the conditions of its own existence. 
Typically these disruptions demonstrate that, deconstructively, freedom of speech 
and critique are imbricated in non-freedoms not only constitutively, but also 
causally and consequentially. That said, it is clear that as soon as the state 
withdraws its withdrawal of ‘supervision over the paths that philosophy [and any 
other discipline] takes’, academic freedom, as Butler understands it, has been 
compromised (Butler, 2009: 780). But as she reminds us, ‘in our contemporary 
predicament, it is not only the state that exerts consequential pressure on the 
course of academic and intellectual life (so do political lobbies, alumni 
associations, the media, and other funding agencies)’ (Butler, 2009: 776). 
I now turn to look at these ‘pressures’, as manifest in the UK, and as they pertain 
in broad terms to Arts and Humanities research. 
An inventory of incursions on academic freedom 
The list that follows, which is not exhaustive, but which may be the first inventory 
of its kind, is informed by my experience as a Higher Education teacher and 
researcher in dialogue with key reading in the field: for instance, Stefan Collini’s 
What Are Universities For? (2012), ‘Who are the Spongers Now?’ (2016), and 
Speaking of Universities (2017). And while some of the initiatives discussed 
below are specific to the UK, they are seldom atypical of governmental or market 
originating interventions into Higher Education in other liberal democracies. In 
concentrating on the idea of a loss of rights in academic freedom I am not 
overlooking the fact that the latter ‘also comes with the responsibility to respect 
the democratic rights and freedoms of others’ (UCU, 2009); an end that many 
academics are at pains to acknowledge, and which is often precisely a motivation 
for defending academic freedom as a principle. 
The role of deterrent in academic speech: ‘Prevent’ 
In recent times, one of the most controversial challenges to UK universities’ 
autonomy and academic freedom has been the government’s ‘Prevent’ agenda. 
‘Prevent’ is a term taken from the wording of The Counter-Terrorism and Security 
Act 2015, which ‘provide[s] a general duty on a range of organisations to prevent 
people being drawn into terrorism’ (United Kingdom Government, 2015a). One 
such body comprises most UK universities – referred to as ‘RHEBs’ (‘Relevant 
Higher Education Bodies’) because, as the government argues, 
[a]lthough it is vital that universities and colleges must protect academic freedom [. . .] 
Universities and colleges – and, to some extent, university societies and student groups – 
have a clear and unambiguous role to play in helping to safeguard vulnerable young 
people from radicalisation and recruitment by terrorist organisations. (United Kingdom 
Government, 2011: 72) 
So ‘[e]ncouragement of terrorism and inviting support for a proscribed terrorist 
organisation are both criminal offences. RHEBs should not provide a platform for 
these offences to be committed’ (United Kingdom Government, 2015b: 4). 
Compliance with the duty is monitored, by HEFCE (Higher Education Funding 
Council for England) for example, ‘at the Government’s request’ (HEFCE, 
2017b). 
At its 2015 Congress, the UCU ‘passed policy’, which, among other things, 
objected that Prevent ‘seriously threatens academic freedom and freedom of 
speech’ (UCU, 2015), answering questions put elsewhere by such as David 
Palfreyman: ‘is academic freedom within UK universities challenged by recent 
terrorism legislation?’ (Palfreyman, 2007). In thinking about the implications of 
this programme, which is one of the most overtly ‘political’ in this inventory, for 
research-as-academic freedom, there is of course the title. This resonates 
ironically, given Butler’s understanding of critique as the potential for ‘political 
dissent’. 
In the academic literature responding to Prevent, there is some discussion of the 
way in which the duty serves to stop speech (Allen, 2017; Scott-Baumann, 2017; 
Thompson, 2017). But speech is also actively commissioned, in the name of 
freedom: ‘RHEBs’ commitment to freedom of speech [. . .] means that they 
represent one of our most important arenas for challenging extremist views and 
ideologies’ (United Kingdom Government, 2015b: 3). This is notable not the least 
because it radically revises the current legal understanding of academic freedom. 
Speech is, by implication, legally commanded. And when ‘freedom of speech’ is 
deployed to ‘challenge’ (anything), then speech is no longer free, but duty-bound, 
albeit in the name of the principle of free-speech. Whether by commission or 
omission, Prevent- inflected speech exemplifies the other side of Butler’s paradox, 
as free-speech’s threat to government is governmentally, threatened. 
While Prevent is symptomatic of a research landscape newly dotted with 
constraints, it is atypical in working by deterrent: such is the nature of the law, 
which supports its strictures with the threat of punishment. Other impositions on 
academic freedom use, to varying degrees, incentive, sometimes in conjunction 
with the threat of penalty for actions not performed. Habitually, incentives to 
occupy academic content in a given way involve financial reward (e.g. research 
awards, promotion, funding for departments or research groups), when sometimes 
these arise as a consequence of the marketisation of Higher Education. In this 
scenario, ‘use of government intervention to establish and regulate markets’ 
(Letizia, 2015, quoted in McGovern, 2016: 49) is often overlooked, with 
governmental agency ‘masked by the rhetoric of the free hand of the market’ 
(McGovern, 2016: 49). However, recent initiatives economising UK academic 
discourse in various ways are almost always underpinned by legislation. Two such 
relate to the state’s funding of research, more specifically referred to as the ‘dual 
support system’. As Collini notes, ‘[a]t present, the basic funding for research goes 
directly to universities, in line with their REF performance, while funding for 
particular projects is distributed, on a competitive basis, through the research 
councils’ (Collini, 2016). The latter is addressed first. 
The role of incentives: Dual support: Research Council funding 
Here, constrained academic speech most obviously occurs when Research Council 
funding is ring-fenced, and its agendas inflect or fail to enable academics’ work. 
As Collini writes: 
The degree to which large elements of research funding are now confined to so-called 
‘national priorities’ – topics which the government itself, not researchers in the relevant 
fields, deems it ‘worth’ researching – constitutes a level of direct interference that simply 
would not have been countenanced twenty years ago. (Collini, 2012: 196) (His ‘twenty 
years’ extends mine by five.) Often ‘national priorities’ – known as ‘thematic 
research’, ‘priority areas’ and the like – are closely aligned with what Collini 
defines as ‘instrumental goods’ (Collini, 2012: 137) designed to ‘increase 
economic competitiveness’ (Collini, 2012: 138). In more recent terms, such 
priorities also facilitate demonstration of ‘Impact’ when that requires (RCUK 
funded) research to ‘achieve demonstrable benefits to the economy and society’ 
(Collini, 2012: 169). Just such a vector of priorities can be seen in the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council’s declaration that it ‘will support and advance [...] 
targeted initiatives in Heritage, Design, Languages, and the Creative Economy’ 
(RCUK, 2016: 7). And this text continues: ‘we will advance our priority areas. 
The role of Design research in policy, entrepreneurship and public service 
innovation will be enhanced. New international initiatives in Heritage will secure 
the UK’s place at the cutting edge of this dynamic multidisciplinary field’ (RCUK, 
2016: 7). 
In this way, research is prescribed both at the level of its content, and its purpose, 
or at least, the former for the latter. And while this constraint is indeed 
incentivized by the promise of funding, perhaps in turn incentivized by possible 
career-advancement, it might also hinge upon the ‘negative incentive’ or 
possibility of penalty, when securing funding might be seen to militate against 
redundancy. 
There is another level to agenda-setting for research: seen in universities’ adoption 
of strategic themes that also reward, or otherwise encourage certain kinds of work. 
Combined to produce often-complex overlays, there is a danger that these two 
grids leave very little room for academics’ self-determined projects, and in the 
worst-case scenario, no room at all. This is the research-equivalent of universities’ 
‘strategic’ determination of curricula. 
The role of incentives: Dual support: The Research Excellence 
Framework 
Defined as a mechanism for distributing ‘funds for research on the basis of 
research quality’ taking ‘into account the volume and relative cost of research in 
different areas’ (HEFCE, 2017a), the Research Excellence Framework (‘REF’) is 
the second means by which the UK government funds research, and in doing so, 
has a stake in its trajectory. In the ‘Bibliometry’ chapter of What Are Universities 
For?, Collini makes the case against its early incarnations, especially as the RAE 
– Research Assessment Exercise – when principally concerned with measuring. 
My concern with the REF is somewhat different, but preserves the idea that the 
REF is an instrument for finding out (about research), which in the process 
constructs its objects. 
And REF-assessment has a doubly constitutive affect. For not only does it 
construct the field by identifying certain activities as research rather than others, as 
Collini, again, points out (Collini, 2012: 123; see also Harley, 2010), but more 
extremely, if routinely, it becomes the matrix by which new research is produced, 
as assessment is ‘gamed’ (Gibney, 2016; Holmwood et al., 2016). The emergence 
of the term ‘REFable’ – to indicate ‘REF-assessable’ research – is telling here. 
While REF is a complex apparatus, not the least because the rubric changes with 
each iteration, its constitutive work – which inflects and excludes expressions 
(Gibney, 2016) – can be broadly conceived to bear upon the form as well as 
content of academic writing. This extends the compass of concern in respect of 
academic freedom. So the emphasis, for instance, on a certain quantity of 
publication within a given period has implications for the mode that takes. A 
Taylorist analysis proposes that insistence on more (units of) production risks 
poorer and smaller outcomes, such that ‘slight articles and premature “syntheses” 
are encouraged over the ‘major project’ which ‘might not yield any entries for the 
annual return for several years to come’ (Collini, 2012: 127). And various 
distinctions within academic writing further formalise this effect, most notably 
privileging journal articles over books, when the former are habitually the shorter 
form. (This privilege is then compounded by a perceived preference for double 
blind peer-reviewed texts, when that tends to favour journal articles over books – 
see University of Gloucestershire, n.d.: 6–7.) At least, these were the formative 
conditions as I write; they may well change when the guidance for the REF 2021 
has been finalised. 
Research content, on the other hand, is more affected by the REF’s concern with 
measuring quality. Leaving to one side the pervasively constitutive effects of 
evaluation, there is a particular aspect of the latest REF that may be little short of 
programmatic: the ‘Impact’ agenda, as discussed above. Accounting for 25% of a 
REF-rating, this risks the extra-disciplinary determination of disciplinary and 
inter-disciplinary enquiry, and worse, exploitation-driven exploration. As Collini 
asks ‘will scholars [...] be encouraged to work on topics that have [...] “market” 
potential?’ (Collini, 2012: 172). But while the rhetorical question points to the way 
in which research is in danger of becoming a function of economic capital, it 
should also be noted that the recent Stern Review proposes measures that reduce 
the force of ‘Impact’. One such is the idea of relaxing the number and spread of 
submissions required to demonstrate contribution to ‘society and economy’ 
(United Kingdom Government, 2016: 21). 
So in the ‘dual support’ system, and considered in relation to the two conceptual 
frameworks that this article invokes, ‘academic freedom’ in research is clearly 
compromised, as the state intervenes (if at one remove) to support some agendas, 
some of which are also marketised, and by omission, to discourage others. 
I now turn to look at a third significant incursion on academic freedom in the UK. 
The role of incentives: The ‘TEF’ 
The value of research to teaching has long been acknowledged; likewise, the value 
of researchers to Higher Education teaching. Or in the words of a Higher 
Education Academy blog, ‘[e]xcellent teaching goes hand in hand with excellent 
research’ (Burgum and Stoakes, 2016), implying that research informs teaching 
but not vice-versa. The ‘TEF’ (Teaching Excellence Framework) alters that. 
While demonstrably directed at teaching, the TEF – another framework for 
assessment – links teaching to research by more than just a rhyming acronym. The 
measurement of teaching – which, in the UK 2017 Higher Education Bill, is 
tethered to reward – explicitly compels research in stating that ‘[t]he learning 
environment is enriched by linkages between teaching and scholarship, research or 
professional practice’ (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2016: 12). 
With the TEF in view, the canny academic might be tempted to review any new 
research projects against the TEF criteria – all 10 of them – and inflect their 
endeavours accordingly, considering, for example, the impact of their research on 
their own students’ post-university employment. And however the relationship 
between the TEF and universities’ ability to raise tuition fees is constituted, there 
are still incentives for academics to consider the ‘marketing-value’ of their 
research. When recruitment is a cutthroat business, staff profiles doubtless make a 
difference. Arguably, some topics speak to applicants more than others. And 
arguably too, a judiciously orchestrated suite of research interests might boost 
application, conversion and retention rates across the board, not just at the level of 
postgraduate research, though this might happen with less force than other matters 
often privileged by prospectuses, such as lifestyle opportunities. Hence the 
measurement of teaching is yet another way in which academic freedom in 
research is constrained. 
The freedom of constrained writing: What must be done 
In ‘Critique, Dissent, Disciplinarity’, Judith Butler notes that first term in her title 
is ‘not merely or only a sort of nay-saying, an effort to take apart and demolish an 
existing structure’. But 
[r]ather, critique is the operation that seeks to understand how delimited conditions form 
the basis for the legitimate use of reason in order to determine what can be known, what 
must be done, and what may be hoped – the three aims of critique as Kant formulated 
them. (Butler, 2009: 787) 
Likewise, concerned as I am with knowing the incursions on academic freedom, I 
am still more concerned with ‘what must be done’ to resist those, as something 
more than hope that things might change. Next, I elaborate on one way forward for 
the writing of research. 
It is informed by ideas about the way in which power works, and hence how 
change might come about. Crucially, while I recognise the possibility of pushing 
past constraints to say and do something truly new, I also recognise the authority 
of the established order and know that the ‘truly new’ can also be the space of 
exile and invisibility. When the threats to academic freedom – government and 
marketization – are waxing strong, this approach to power would seem to be 
essential. So I commend a more interventionist approach, which recognises the 
value of the status quo as it enables speech, and yet seeks to challenge what may 
be said and done from within, drawing strength from the currency that this affords. 
This theory of power, which might be described as pragmatic, also underpins 
Judith Butler’s version of academic freedom. 
However, before I elaborate on my proposed strategy, I first want to look at the 
way in which recent writing that protests incursions on academic freedom also 
proposes strategies for resisting such. This sets the scene for my contribution to 
the field. 
Preserving academic freedom: The literature 
Given that the topic touches every academic, it is not surprising that the writing on 
academic freedom is extensive. My university’s online library revealed that 
around 8,000 journal articles had been published on the subject in the last decade. 
A sample was required. So I qualified ‘academic freedom’ with ‘preserving’ – 
rather than the more-often used ‘defending’ – in order to capture an address to 
actions taken to protect the concept, i.e. over and above (just) declarations of 
support, which the idea of ‘defence’ might imply. And I restricted results to 
journal articles published in the last 10 years. I also decided against refining the 
review geographically, or subject-wise, on the hunch that inventive ideas for 
resistance could come from any area. I did however limit the results to the first 10 
entries. 
While these addressed a range of aspects of the topic, all can be identified with 
one of three broad approaches: first-hand accounts of violations of the author’s 
academic freedom (Gottfredson, 2010; Peterson-Overton, 2011); examinations of 
particular features of the topic, e.g. academic freedom as ‘thought-time’ (Noonan, 
2015), but see also Andreescu (2009), Coetzee (2016), Orenstein and Stoll-Ron 
(2014), and Schrecker (2012); and lastly: rationales for academic freedom 
(Bernstein, 2008; Karran, 2009; Tierney and Lechuga, 2010). 
Across these approaches, 9 of the 10 texts clearly expressed support for academic 
freedom as their author(s) had defined it, with the one exception being Carli 
Coetzee’s review of John Higgins’s Academic Freedom in a Democratic South 
Africa (Coetzee, 2016). Crucially, quoting Amina Mama and Ayesha Iman, 
Coetzee contends that ‘freedom is always relative, and determined by the social 
relations and political economy of the academic world and of the wider society’, 
such that in South Africa it ‘needs to be theorised in favour of black South 
Africans, who are represented as cleaners, gardeners and students but rarely 
professors’ (Coetzee, 2016: 207). In other words, academic freedom is not a social 
good if it also reproduces social inequality. 
However, only 6 of the 10 texts consider strategies for resisting the erosion of 
academic freedom: (Bernstein, 2008; Coetzee, 2016; Gottfredson, 2010; Karran, 
2009; Peterson-Overton, 2011; Tierney and Lechuga, 2010). (Schrecker suggests 
that resistance is futile in proposing that ‘when they have not been passively 
acquiescing in their own marginalization, American professors have been fighting 
and losing a rearguard action against the structural changes of the past forty years 
that have undermined the power and autonomy of the faculty’ (Schrecker, 2012: 
4).) In reporting on the more optimistic responses to the question of how academic 
freedom may be actively defended, I will start with sweeping calls-to-arms and 
progress to more specific propositions. 
Comparing and contrasting support for academic freedom in two different kinds of 
US university (‘non-profit’ and ‘for-profit’), and hence the role of both in the 
‘development of a democratic society’, Tierney and Lechuga are not primarily 
concerned with defending academic freedom. However, in noting the particular 
erosion of academic freedom in for-profit institutions, they quote Henry Giroux to 
propose ‘the need for academics, students, parents, social activists, labor 
organizers, and artists to join together and oppose the transformation of higher 
education into commercial spheres’ (Tierney and Lechuga, 2010: 119). 
Alison R Bernstein proposes ‘joining together’ of a slightly different kind, but also 
in broad terms, as a means of protecting academic freedom. Writing in her role as 
vice-president of the Ford Foundation, she presents the organisation’s ‘Difficult 
Dialogues’ programme, which ‘asked for deeper engagement on the part of 
campus leaders, including faculty, with threats to academic freedom and 
pluralism’. Yet in this very short text, Bernstein does not indicate how dialogue is 
practised as a strategy, instead focussing on its role in making ‘diversity a more 
powerful priority on campus’ (Bernstein, 2008: 8). 
Somewhat more specifically, and reviewing John Higgins’ Academic Freedom in 
a Democratic South Africa, Carli Coetzee notes the effectiveness of ‘the student-
led protest movement’, ‘Rhodes Must Fall’ – ‘the statue’s “fall” iconically 
representing the need to decolonize the university, the curriculum and knowledge’ 
(Coetzee, 2016: 201). Coetzee appears to identify this action with a defence of 
academic freedom. 
Direct action as resistance is also mentioned in Linda Gottfredson’s ‘Lessons in 
academic freedom as lived experience’ (Gottfredson, 2010) though, as someone 
else’s protest, it does not comprise one of the lessons of her title. Of those, how- 
ever, the last of the six addresses ‘what individual academics can do’ (Gottfredson, 
2010: 280) to safeguard their professional freedoms, informed by her observations 
that academic freedom has ‘maintenance costs’; ‘is not self-enforcing’ and is ‘not 
often defended by academics themselves’ (Gottfredson, 2010: 273). Gottfredson 
advises attention to ‘low-stakes decisions’ and challenging these when they are 
‘suppressive’; and speaking up when ‘[f]allacious reasoning impedes enforcement 
of academic freedom’ (Gottfredson, 2010: 280). And she concludes that ‘all 
[academics] can contribute to safe-guarding academic freedom’ whether that is via 
actions ‘to encourage free speech and protest ideologically-slanted research’; 
‘giv[ing] voice to ideas with which they disagree’ or ‘refus[ing] to feign 
disapproval of “controversial” research they privately respect’ (Gottfredson, 2010: 
280). This shapes up as a useful guidance for day-to-day dissidence – at the other 
end of the spectrum from ‘legal redress’, which she also discusses, noting that 
such ‘redress is arduous and costly’ (Gottfredson, 2010: 276). 
In another first-hand account of violated academic freedom, Kristofer J Peterson-
Overton tells of how an offer of employment was rescinded when ‘a student 
contacted the department expressing concerns about [his] political views’ 
(Peterson-Overton, 2011: 257). He responded by generating huge publicity for his 
dismissal, and the University involved ‘reversed its decision’ (Peterson-Overton, 
2011: 259). While the story is not told to give a ‘lesson’, it does work by example 
to propose that in such scenarios, mobilising a ‘groundswell of support’ (Peterson- 
Overton, 2011: 259) can lead to effective redress. 
And finally, there is the specificity of martyrdom as protest. In a text justifying 
academic freedom, Terence Karran writes: ‘[h]istorical analyses reveal that 
academic freedom [in the early university] was hard won [...] with some 
academics (like Giordano Bruno) paying for their beliefs with their lives’ 
commenting that ‘[t]he disinclination for contemporary academics to protect their 
academic freedom with similar vigour is disheartening’ (Karran, 2009: 278). 
Turning to assess the relationship between these strategies and my concern with 
methods for defending academic freedom in research-writing, I will first declare 
that I do not condone the ultimate self-sacrifice. Beyond that, it may be noted that 
none of these texts is focussed on the issue of action against eroded academic 
freedom, which is symptomatic of the wider paucity of writing on this aspect of 
the field. (In his recent book, Speaking of Universities, Stefan Collini devotes only 
one chapter – ‘Speaking Out’ – to ‘strategies’ for protesting the ‘damage currently 
being done to British universities’ (Collini, 2017: 206) – a subject that is much 
wider than the issue of academic freedom.) And reasons for that absence could be 
proposed: if not agreeing Karran’s point about the ‘pavidity’ of academics 
(Karran, 2009: 279), then it might be con- ceded that it is often easier to demolish 
(‘say “no”’), than rebuild. 
But importantly: the scope of application in these strategies varies. Some offer 
responses in extremis (Coetzee, 2016; Karran, 2009; Peterson-Overton, 2011); 
some constitute discrete programmes (see Bernstein’s ‘Difficult Dialogues’ 
initiative, which is moreover, dependent on the Ford Foundation’s funding); and 
others take the form of calls to general dissidence (Gottfredson, 2010; Tierney and 
Lechuga, 2010 – looking to Henry Giroux). 
With Gottfredson, in particular, I am concerned with strategies that can be 
deployed in a day-to-day capacity, but specifically for research, and at the point of 
writing (up); research-as-text, and textuality. Further still, and in contradistinction 
to Gottfredson, I am more programmatically concerned with critique in its dual 
aspect: not just ‘saying no’ but crucially, the issue of ‘what can be done’. And 
unlike Gottfredson, I am less concerned with the ‘consistent’ performance of 
‘small acts of support to prevent incursions’ (Gottfredson, 2010: 273) but rather 
with one simple gesture. When the sampled literature supports my combination of 
concerns as a contribution to the field, it is this I now address. 
A new use for footnotes 
In constrained academic writing the concept of the ‘rule’ is a central motif. Such 
writing is, perhaps, ‘over-ruled’, both in being subject to too many rules and in 
that excess, regulated from outside; by external interests. And in thinking about 
resisting this excess, a literary movement concerned with the emancipatory quality 
of rules offers a way forward: OuLiPo, which counted the radical artist Marcel 
Duchamp among its members. Contracting ‘Ouvroir de Littérature Potentielle’, 
(‘workshop of potential literature’), OuLiPo included writers such as Raymond 
Queneau and Italo Calvino, who variously deployed a range of eccentric 
constraints to explore the possibilities of literary expression. Famously, George 
Perec’s novel, La Disparition (1969) was written without recourse to the letter ‘e’. 
When literary modernism is traditionally identified with breaking rules, even as it 
depends on those for its transgressive power (see Woolf, Eliot, and Joyce), 
OuLiPo contrived to produce new forms in literature by recourse to a hyper-rule. 
The generative capacity of this is emblematised in Queneau’s Cent Mille Milliards 
de Poems, which, horizontally, cuts through a book of 10 sonnets, line by line, 
liberating in the possibility of their recombination, 100,000,000,000,000 poems. 
Likewise, I propose a new rule for research-writing that, in being laid over 
existing rules, aims at a related liberation. It takes as its starting point the idea of 
academic referencing, or the professional requirement for academic authors to 
acknowledge the origins of their ideas in other authors’ work. And it extends this 
to encompass the other ‘authors’ who are now involved in academic discourse: 
extra-disciplinary agencies; hence a new use for footnotes, which would enable 
such ‘authors’ to be acknowledged. And if the footnote is a marginal device – 
literally – Jacques Derrida reminds us that the marginal (‘parergon’) is never 
trivial, and never outside the main body of the text (‘ergon’). Rather, for Derrida, 
the margins are always coming into the inside, in order to reveal the inside’s 
complexities. In the case of my proposed annotations, no less is at stake than the 
question of the ‘truth’ of research’s authorship (Derrida, 1987). 
So I propose that every time an academic author knows their writing to be 
compelled by extra-disciplinary concerns, they note the source of that. By way of 
demonstration, I will annotate the means by which one aspect of this text – its 
form – has been determined by external forces. (And before I do, I will note that 
the very act of writing on the subject – of academic freedom – is the first surrender 
to extrinsic influence, when it typically becomes a subject only when imperilled.) 
But because I have committed to critique in its double, positive and negative 
condition, I will also use the space of the footnote to propose a way of enabling 
the freedom that has been frustrated.2 
Although I have no means of proving it, the idea of a REF-alternative for art was 
prompted by my self-set rule. The space of the footnote, with its requirement to 
devise a constructive response to other kinds of constraint, brought something into 
being. Or conceptualised in Jeff Noonan’s terms, the space is (also) time, when 
academic freedom, for research, requires ‘thought time’ to take precedence over 
‘money-time’; ‘time free from externally imposed routines and deadlines’ 
(Noonan, 2015: 111). 
In offering this discussion by way of an example for a footnote as a kind of 
‘calling out’ and ‘calling for’, I would also note three further points. First, that the 
annotation need not be so long. Second, that the absence of constraint does not 
need noting, except perhaps, when constraint has been ignored, and therefore 
might incur future penalty. And third: that this kind of annotation might be used by 
any discipline although its identification with critique and its literary origins make 
it most apt for Arts and Humanities research. 
Of course it can be argued that academic journals ask for something very similar 
to what I am proposing, in requesting ‘full disclosure’ of authors’ ‘conflicts of 
interest’. But in practice it is not the same, when journals’ requests take a very 
narrow view of what could constitute influence. Certainly, in naming, as I propose, 
those interests that conflict with academic freedom, there are a range of benefits. 
Most importantly, in revealing the external determinations of the writing of 
research, this additional referencing would make those more available for debate 
and therefore, for contestation. And the gesture would demystify, in bringing to 
light the forces of academic discourse that are, at present, lurking in the shadows. 
In doing so, it would challenge both ‘arm’s length’ governmental power and the 
power of capitalization. 
And for posterity, it would enable interpretation in supplying a context that might 
be otherwise overlooked. At a point in history when academic writing looks in 
opposite directions – to external and internal goals – for its agendas, such 
annotation should mitigate future readers’ confusion. There would also be an 
element of poetic justice. As the academic is instrumentalised by externalities, the 
instrumentalised (academic) would be academicised. 
And yet: precisely as that extra-referencing took place, power’s demands would be 
realized. In that way, all those aspects of academic life, including careers, that are 
underpinned by tactical and strategic addresses to power’s desire would, at the 
very least, be unimpeded and, at best, progressed. Or at least, that is a possibility. 
It is surely worth a try, when attempts at change are in such short supply. 
Notes 
1. ‘The Haldane Principle is popularly used to describe the notion that “decisions about 
what to spend research funds on should be made by researchers rather than 
politicians”’ 
(https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmdius/168/1680
7.htm; accessed 26 May 2017).  
2. To note that this text takes the form of an academic, double peer-reviewed journal 
article may seem to be an odd place to start a claim about constraint on academic 
freedom. Such a means of expression is, after all, the academic’s stock-in-trade. 
But not for every discipline. For those of us who work in Fine Art, and have 
‘academic’ and art-practices as an aspect of our teaching and research roles, there 
is often a dilemma: article or artwork? Of course, a given topic may determine 
one above the other, but when this is in favour of the latter, or both options have 
equal merits, then there is a danger that external factors settle the debate. One 
such factor is the formal, governmental, measuring and assessment of research, 
which is the REF in the UK. In this framework, artworks are non-standard items, 
which are often seen as problematic. This ‘exceptionality’ stems largely from the 
idea that the artwork ‘does not embody a form of knowledge’ (see Scrivener, 
2002; and McArthur, 2004, for the Arts and Humanities Research Board). And so 
for REF purposes, the artwork requires a written, 300-word supplement that 
locates its role in a process that does produce knowledge over and above the 
artwork as, say, affect or ‘apprehension’ in Scrivener’s term. For the purposes of 
REF submission then, an art- work is both more burdensome and reduced and 
marginal. Moreover, it often comes without the gold standard of the double blind 
review; that which makes the journal article the privileged written form. So 
metrics-wise, these circumstances make the journal article the more attractive 
option. And it is these circumstances that prevailed when I wanted to address the 
topic of academic freedom. I could have responded with an art- work in the genre 
of Institutional Critique. 
What is to be done? 
As the scenario that I describe above proposes, academic freedom is not just a 
matter of ‘free speech’ at the level of an academic’s (self-)expression, but also 
depends upon a set of apparatuses that allow that speech to register and freely 
circulate. Clearly, the REF hinders the latter in respect of art: it makes art 
production the less attractive option for research assessment purposes, and 
requires it to circulate as something it is not, in short curtailing art as quantity and 
quality. If art must be measured and assessed as an academic output then the 
obvious response is not to change the object but to change the metric. If, 
following the REF, the TEF and the proposed ‘Knowledge Exchange Framework’ 
(KEF), in the UK, then why not a framework for creative practice, even if the 
acronym does not readily extend the suite? At the very least, this would start to 
recognise the specificity of art, which is specific in ways far beyond other 
disciplinary differences. 
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